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TOWARDS A HISTORY OF ESSENTIAL
FEDERALISM: ANOTHER LOOK AT OWEN IN
AMERICA
by Carol Weisbrod*
INTRODUCTION
Today we take the state for granted. We grumble about its
demands; we complain that it is encroaching more and more
on what used to be our private concerns, but we can hardly
envisage life without it. In the world of today, the worst fate
that can befall a human being is to be stateless. Hale's "man
without a country" does exist now, and he is wretched in
ways which Hale could never imagine. The old forms of so-
cial identification are no longer absolutely necessary. A man
can lead a reasonably full life without a family, a fixed local
residence, or a religious affiliation, but if he is stateless he is
nothing. He has no rights, no security, and little opportunity
for a useful career. There is no salvation on earth outside the
framework of an organized state.
-Joseph Strayer'
The "we" is said with confidence. This sense of the importance of
the state is one to which we moderns are committed. It is parallel to
the master trend of American law toward centralization, as Lawrence
Friedman has described it. "One basic, critical fact of 19th century
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut.
This article is an expanded and revised version of a paper delivered in New Lanark. Scotland,
July 1988, at the conference on Utopian Thought and Communal Experience. I learned from
many participants at that conference, particularly from Gregory Clacys and Lyman Tower Sar-
gent. I would also like to acknowledge with thanks the assistance of Philip Hamburger. Richard
Kay, Leon Lipson, Hugh Macgill, Martha Minow, Pamela Shingorn, Avi Soifer, and participants
in a faculty symposium at the law school at Northeastern University in October 1988.
1. ON THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE MODERN STATE 3 (1970); cf. W. AUDEN. September /.
1939, in SELECTED PoEMs 88 (E. Mendelson ed. 1979).
There is no such thing as the State
And no one exists alone . ...
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law," Friedman writes, "was that the official legal system began to pen-
etrate deeper into society." 2 The master trend is "to create one legal
culture out of many; to reduce legal pluralism; . .. to increase the
proportion of persons, relative to the whole population, who are con-
sumers or objects of that law. This master trend continues, and acceler-
ates . .. ."I
As part of this master trend and the corresponding emphasis on
the state, we see official law as uniquely important. Thus, Ronald
Dworkin begins Law's Empire by saying that "we live in and by the
law. It makes us what we are: citizens and employees and doctors and
spouses and people who own things . . . . Given this view of law's
importance, it is no wonder that we focus on issues of official
adjudication.5
But there are other views in which, for example, state law itself is
bounded by other rulers and other "law." We have the familiar state-
ment of John Chipman Gray: "[T]he real rulers of a political society
are undiscoverable . . . . 6 And pluralist tendencies continue. Law-
rence Friedman tells us that the struggle between centralism and
decentralism is persistent and continuing. "[D]ecentralization does not
vanish," he says, "even in the teeth of the master trend of American
legal history."7
Both the narrative of legal centralism and that of state building at
least implicitly concede a pluralist counter story. For example, both as-
sume an earlier time when decentralization and a reduced "sense of the
2. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 99 (1973). Bruce Mann's NEIGHBORS AND
STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY CONNECTICUT (1987) can be cited for the master
trend and, particularly, for the hegemony of the formal legal system over dispute resolution, Id. at
10. In 1923, Arthur Corbin thought that pluralism within the law characterized the American
system and that, "while the line between law and equity has become blurred and is disappearing,
distinctions between Illinois rights and New York rights have been increasing." Corbin, Rights
and Duties, 33 YALE L.J. 502, 507 (1923). "It should be remembered further that while there has
been the constant tendency toward unification by the welding of law and equity . . . there has
been an even greater development toward complexity and conflict due to the multiplication of
independent political jurisdictions." Id.
3. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 572; see also L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
662 (2d ed. 1985).
4. Preface to R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE at vii (1986); see also A. BICKEL, MORALITY OF
CONSENT 5 (1975) (discussing law as the value of values).
5. See generally Galanter, Adjudication, Litigation, and Related Phenomena, in LAW AND
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 151 (L. Lipson & S. Wheeler eds. 1986).
6. J. GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 77 (1909). On John Chipman Gray (1839-
1915)-author of the treatise on the Rule Against Perpetuities (1886)-as a transitional intellec-
tual figure, see G. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE 602 (1973).
7. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 572.
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state" may be taken as facts of America's history.8 As part of his
8. There is a link between the idea that America had little "sense or the state" and the fact
that America had a federal system. In A. VINCENT, THEORIES OF THE STATE 10 (1987). Andrew
Vincent includes the United States in those societies "which do not have a tradition of Statehood."
These societies "lack a historical and legal tradition of the State as an institution that 'acts' in the
name of the public authority . . as well as a tradition of continuous intellectual preoccupation
with the idea of the state." Id. (quoting K. DYSON, THE STATE TRADITION IN WESTERN EUROPE-
A STUDY OF AN IDEA AND INSTITUTION at viii (1980)). "There are two primary determinants of
this lack of a state tradition; firstly, institutional structures, and secondly, juristic and ideological
traditions." Id. at 10-11. The United States,
with its federal structure, does not foster a "sense" of the State. Federalism encourages
centrifugal forces, distinct legal structures, and a general mistrust of centralism ....
The State in its historical development, has been a centripetal force; the balance of forces
rest at the centre, even though a State may tolerate or even encourage some local
autonomy.
Id. at 11. Still, he concludes this point can be overemphasized.
Britain and the USA do have some sense of the State. There is a firm grasp of territorial
integrity, sovereignty, citizenship and the rule of law and the like. The actual powers of
the State in practice remain untouched. However such powers are not reflected on. The
State is not seen as a public power which acts.
Id.
D'Entreves notes, however, that according to one view of the state, the state and the law are
basically the same thing, and if we look for the state, we find officials. A. D'ENTREvES. THE
NOTION OF THE STATE. AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL THEORY 5 (1967). "For the jurist, the
State can be nothing other than the body of laws in force at a given time and place. The State
itself is created by the law. State and law coincide: the State is the legal system." Id.
For the relative unimportance of the idea of the state, see S. HUNTIrNGTON. A.IERICAN POLI-
TICS: THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY 35 (1981), noting that "the idea of the state implied the
concentration of sovereignty in a single, centralized, governmental authority." Huntington indi-
cates that this idea "never took hold among the English North American colonists," despite "ful-
minations of Blackstone." Id. The state, he says, appears in American political thought only at the
end of the nineteenth century.
Yet somehow Austinian positivism, with its emphasis on the command of the sovereign, and
the idea of law as founded in the State did take hold. Moreover, in America, even legal pluralist
tendencies within the state system are presented as minimized by rules of priority.
The American system, like the English, has certain formal-seeming rules of hierarchical
priority for the resolution of some of the above conflicts. These rules appear on the sur-
face to resolve conflicts by reference to the differing degrees of "rank formality,, of the
competing laws. Thus the federal Constitution is supreme and takes precedence over all
forms of law to the contrary; valid federal statutes take priority over contrary federal
case-law and contrary state law generally, and so on ....
P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS. FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN AMERICAN LAW. A CO'IPARATIvE STUDY
OF LEGAL REASONING 56 (1987). Thus, one has a conventional map of a legal system.
According to that map, the accuracy of which need not yet concern us, law is prescribed
by a single, known official organ, or by two or more of them in compliance with a process
that itself has been officially prescribed; law is interpreted and applied to disputes by a
court or a set of courts, or by sets of courts linked through secondary rules that are
calculated to reconcile or harmonize conflicts; statutes are administered, and regulations
promulgated, by agencies coordinated closely or loosely under central authority- and com-
pliance is known to be enforced where necessary by official authority whose physical
power is in general adequate to the purpose.
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discussion of America as a "plastic" and "malleable" society, Merle
Curti refers to a "widespread commitment to anti-statism and volun-
tary associations."" Thus, there is a tension between the lawyer's story
of American history (in the beginning, America was founded under the
Constitution, Blackstone was important, 10 and the Marshall Court un-
dertook national consolidation) and that told by others (in the begin-
ning, America had little sense of the state"' and did not follow Black-
stone). 2 For lawyers, the master trend almost entirely ignores, if it
does not conceal, the counter story.
This article is a preliminary effort to reach that story. It starts
with Robert Owen's1 3 visit to America and, particularly, his addresses
to the American Congress.
That picture-the utopian lecturing to the politicians-is one to
which we almost do not know how to react. We see a marginal figure
speaking to central figures, an exotic addressing the mainstream. (Per-
8 L. LIPSON, HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 415-16 (F. Greenstein & N. Polsby eds. 1975)
(Chapter 6 entitled "International Law").
When did this map become conventional in the United States? What relationships can be
traced between the accuracy of the map at any point in time and its acceptance as conventional?
9. Curti, Robert Owen in American Thought, in ROBERT OWEN'S AMERICAN LEGACY: PRO-
CEEDING OF THE ROBERT OWEN BICENTENNIAL CONFERENCE 57 (D. Pitzer ed. 1972).
10. But what did Blackstone represent? For the ambiguity of Blackstone on significant issues,
e.g., natural law and legislative sovereignty, see R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 25 (1975).
11. See, e.g., S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 8; S. SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN
STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982); A. VIN-
CENT, supra note 8 (America had little "sense of the state," but, instead, a sense of "courts and
parties").
12. S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 8, at 35.
13. Robert Owen (1771-1858), a reformer, philanthropist, and communitarian, left Wales at
the age of 10 and, by the age of 20, was the manager of a mill in Manchester. Shortly thereafter,
he established himself as one of the wealthiest cotton spinners of his age. He managed the cotton
mills at New Lanark, Scotland from 1800 until 1829, establishing a model system for the training
of workers and children on the basis of ideas outlined in R. OWEN, A NEW VIEW OF SOCIETY
(1813-1814) and in R. OWEN, REPORT TO THE COUNTY OF LANARK (1821). It was at New
Lanark
that he made his name as the archetype of the benevolent entrepreneur. In educating the
factory children, diminishing the hours of labour and quite spectacularly improving con-
ditions, his main concern as he explained it, was to make the workpeople "rational" thus
to bring "harmony" to the community, to make it a place where social peace would reign,
rather, as he believed it had reigned in the rural community he had known as a boy in
Wales.
Gatrell, Introduction to R. OWEN. REPORT TO THE COUNTY OF LANARK AND A NEW VIEW OF
SOCIETY at 9 (V. Gatrell reprint ed. 1970) (1st eds. 1821 & 1813-1814). Owen's work at New
Lanark turned him to communitarianism, and a number of American utopian experiments were
based broadly on Owenism.
(Vol. 21:979
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haps, however, he was an important exotic? Comparable, in some
sense, to Gandhi meeting with the British?) We hardly know how to
think about Owen in America because our sense that politicians are
important and utopians are not, blinds us to the idea that, in their own
time, they were both points on an experimental spectrum. Specifically,
utopian thinkers, theorists, and practitioners, as much as politicians, 4
must deal with questions relating to their structures and the existing
structures, the future, as they envision it, and the present."
While one may emphasize substantive values in dealing with uto-
pian communitarianism (cooperation or community, for example),
nineteenth-century American utopianism also typically contains a
structural or political value in its commitment to the idea of the small-
scale political unit.' 6 This idea has certain affinities with the concept of
federalism. Communitarianism can also be seen in relation to concepts
of political and legal pluralism, which stress not merely single experi-
ments (an emphasis in American federalist discussion), but also contin-
uing experiments and a permanent diversity within the society. Issues
of size, experimentation, and diversity are discussed by state politicians,
as well as by utopians, and were strikingly in evidence in antebellum
America.
Owen visited the United States in 1824-1825.' This paper outlines
14. H. SIMON. ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 101 (1947). Herbert Simon wrote:
The highest level of integration that man achieves consists in taking an existing set
of institutions as one alternative and comparing it with other sets . . . . Thought at this
comprehensive level has not been common to all cultures. In our Western civilization it
has perhaps been confined to (1) the writings of utopian political theorists and (2) the
thought and writings surrounding modern legislative processes.
Id.
15. "Owen was quite clear that he was the practical, realistic reformer who had demonstrated
a workable future and that it was those who promoted illusions of a religious or political economic
nature who were the really dangerous fantasists." V. GEOGIEGAN. UTOPIANIS!M AND MARXISM 13
(1987).
16. Not all utopians are communitarians. Bellamy's ideas, for example, are statist. See A.
LIPow, AUTHORITARIAN SOCIALISM IN AMERICA. EDWARD BELLAMY AND TIlE NATIONALIST
MOVEMENT (1982). See the discussion of Bellamy in K. KUMAR. UTOPIA AND ANTI-UTOPIA 132-
67 (1987). Nonetheless, the Kaweah community in California is sometimes described as Bel-
lamist. See Y. OVED, Two HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN COMMUNES 240 (1988). On the Ka-
weah Cooperative Commonwealth, see R. HINE. CALIFORNIA'S UTOPIAN COLONIES 78 (1966) (1st
ed. 1953). Bellamy's ideas apparently drew people to the colony, though Bellamy himself thought
that such enterprises could succeed only on a national scale.
17. For an account of the visit, see A. BESTOR. BACKWOODS UTOPIAS. TIlE SECTARIAN ORI-
GINS & THE OWENITE PHASE OF COMMUNITARIAN SOCIALISM IN AMERICA. 1663-1829. at 103-32
(enlarged ed. 1970). On Owen in general, see J. HARRISON. QUEST FOR TIlE NEW MORAL WORLD-,
ROBERT OWEN AND THE OWENITES IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA (1969), and more recently, A.
TAYLOR. VISIONS OF HARMONY: A STUDY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY MILLENARIANISM (1987).
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the views of Owen on questions of pluralism and federalism and com-
pares them with the political theories of some of the Americans with
whom Owen met. A utopian/political encounter seems particularly use-
ful in this inquiry for two reasons. Because utopian theorists and prac-
titioners conceive of themselves as an alternative to the existing social
order, they are forced to confront the issue of their relation to the
outside world and, particularly, to the state more directly than, for ex-
ample, are the founders of limited-purpose internal associations, whose
functions are not usually conceived so broadly. Moreover, the utopian
community is a form of voluntary association (or even corporation),
which is easy to conceptualize as bridging the categories of public and
private or governmental and nongovernmental. Thus, we can fit volun-
tary associations into our treatment of federalism. 8
The parallel between Owen's ideas and the propositions of Ameri-
can political federalism are well-known to utopian scholars. Thus, in his
work on Owenism, Bestor quotes the familiar observation of Holmes,
dissenting in Truax v. Corrigan,19 that the law should not "prevent the
making of social experiments that an important part of the community
desires, in the insulated chambers afforded by the several States, even
though the experiments may seem futile or even noxious."20
The idea that Owen and the utopian tradition may have relevance
to federalism as a mainstream political issue is less familiar to those
who concern themselves with legal and historical treatments of "feder-
alism," which are limited to official governmental structures.
I. OWEN IN AMERICA
The men most active in promoting the adoption of the New
American constitution, and who wrote and perfected their
"Declaration of Rights" acknowledged to the Founder of the
Rational System, that they were, in 1825, after a trial of half
a century, greatly disappointed in the result of the work
-Robert Owen2"
18. See, e.g., A. PEKELIS, Private Governments and the Federal Constitution, in LAW AND
SOCIAL ACTION: SELECTED ESSAYS OF ALEXANDER PEKELIS 91 (M. Konvitz ed.1950).
19. 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
20. Id., quoted by A. BESTOR, supra note 17, at 18; see also New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."). See generally
Clacys, Paternalism and Democracy in the Politics of Robert Owen, 27 INT'L REV. SOC, HIST.
160, 161-207 (1982).
21. THE BOOK OF THE NEW MORAL WORLD 149 (New York 1845).
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Owen came to America as a leading exponent of a tradition in
which enterprises were founded that are today called utopian. They
were often known in their own time as communitarian. "Contempo-
raries were better able than we," Bestor writes,
to recognize the obvious. What these enterprises had in com-
mon was the idea of employing the small experimental com-
munity as a lever to exert upon society the force necessary to
produce reform and change. The ends might differ, with eco-
nomic, religious, ethical and educational purposes mingled in
varying proportions. But the means were uniform, consistent
and well defined. These enterprises constitute a communitar-
ian movement because each made the community the heart of
its plan. 2
Not only was membership in a community a matter of individual
choice, but the whole process by which communitarianism was ex-
pected to spread and remake the world was conceived in noncoercive
terms. Voluntary imitation, the communitarian believed, would suffice.
The community idea having succeeded, many nations would become
gradually in union with it.
As Bestor indicates, "[T]he group procedure that was the heart of
the communitarian program corresponded to a like tendency that rami-
fied through many American institutions and many fields of American
thought."2" Citing Gierke, Maitland, and de Tocqueville on political
associations, Bestor is explicit on the connections to the ideas of
federalism.
Federalism, in the sense opposed to consolidated nationalism,
is an important complement of this respect for, and encour-
agement of autonomous groups. It is therefore no accident
that many close parallels to the communitarian argument may
be found in the classic expositions of the role of states in the
American federal system . . . ingrained in American experi-
ence was the idea of group procedure-of trying political and
social experiments upon units of society less than the
whole-that communitarians found little difficulty in winning
a hearing for their own proposals, couched as they were in
familiar terms.24
22. A. BEsTo, supra note 17, at 3.
23. Id. at 16.
24. Id. at 18-19.
1989]
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
Probably no one received a better hearing than Robert Owen. Oneida's
founder John Humphrey Noyes25 said, in 1870, that Owen, in 1824,
"stirred the very life of the nation with his appeals to Kings and Con-
gresses, and his vast experiments at New Harmony. '2 As Noyes saw
it, New Harmony had "for its antecedent the vast reputation that
Owen had gained by his success at New Lanark. ' '27 Owen "came to
this country with the prestige of a reformer who had the confidence and
patronage of Lords, Dukes and Sovereigns in the old world."2 8
Arthur Bestor has offered a detailed account of Owen's American
trip.29 Bestor records that, on November 26, 1824, Owen was received
by John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State (whom Owen had already
met when Adams was in England).3 0 He also saw President James
Monroe and John C. Calhoun, among many others.31 And, Bestor
writes, while there were "other conversations as well . . . surely none
[was] so remarkable as the council ring in the Dennison Hotel, where
Owen sat down with a group of Choctaw and Chickasaw Chiefs and
gravely explained his new view of society through an interpreter. 32
Bestor describes Owen's American Tour (January 3 to April 13,
1825) as "one of the greatest triumphs of his career. '33 Before this,
25. On Oneida, see C. WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA (1980); see also Weisbrod, On
the Breakup of Oneida, 14 CONN. L. REV. 717 (1982).
26. J. NoYES. HISTORY OF AMERICAN SOCIALIsMs 22 (1870-1966). The community at New
Harmony was founded in 1825 and collapsed in 1827, in part, some suggested, because Owen
himself did not stay in America to guide the community. Thus, the Owenite paper The New
Moral World explained that, while "families of all descriptions" were gathering at New Har-
mony, Owen had to leave for a year. During this period, differences arose among the different
nationalities, and "this absence of Mr. Owen, at this critical period, was unfavorable for the im-
mediate harmony and quiet settlement of the colony into one family, with one interest . . . ." 20
The New Moral World 363 (Sept. 12, 1835). For an assessment of the significance of New Har-
mony, see Lockwood's chapter "New Harmony's Place in History" in G. LOCKWOOD, THE NEW
HARMONY MOVEMENT 1-6 (1905 & reprint 1971).
27. J. NOYES, supra note 26, at 44.
28. Id.
29. A. BESTOR. supra note 17.
30. Id. at 108.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 108-09. See generally CHICKASAWS AND CHOCTAWS: A PAMPHLET OF INFORMATION
CONCERNING THEIR HISTORY, TREATIES, GOVERNMENT, COUNTRY, LAWS, POLITICS AND AFFAIRS
(1891 & reprint 1975); A. DEBo, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CHOCTAW REPUBLIC (1934): A.
DEROSIER, THE REMOVAL OF THE CHOCTAW INDIANS (1970); G. FOREMAN, THE FIVE CIVILIZED
TRIBES (1934).
Owen also met on his trip a southerner (a brother of Jefferson Davis, later President of the
Confederacy) who was interested in Owenite ideas for his plantation. See J. HERMANN, THE PUR-
SUIT OF A DREAM 3-7 (1981).
33. A. BESTOR, supra note 17, at 110.
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Owen "had discussed his plans in small select groups, but from the
beginning he had contemplated a great public campaign .. . that
would culminate in the presentation of his plans to Congress."-" Bestor
continues:
Owen reached Washington just as the House of Repre-
sentatives brought the long presidential canvass to a close by
choosing John Quincy Adams as the next occupant of the
White House. It was a fortunate time for Owen. The electoral
excitement was over, yet the Capital was crowded with the
leading figures of American public life. Owen's prospective
visit had been announced long before in the papers, and at
that time the National Intelligencer had welcomed Owen as
one of those "who seem to have had no thought but how to
lessen the sufferings of the unfortunate and better the condi-
tions of the human race in every quarter of the world.13 5
Bestor notes that an even more extraordinary tribute to Owen was
the fact that he was "readily granted the use of the Hall of Represen-
tatives in the Capitol for two addresses. The first time by arrangement
with Henry Clay, the second time through the good offices of John
Quincy Adams. ' 6
Bestor reports that Adams heard Owen, as did James Monroe,
several members of the Cabinet, the Supreme Court, and the Con-
gress. 37 Owen then visited Jefferson and Madison. Bestor concludes
that, "in every outward respect, Owen's 100 days in the east-it was
precisely that-had been a triumphant success. ' 38 The general atten-
tion paid to Robert Owen, when he visited the United States in 1824-
1825, was extraordinary. Even taken by itself, it might be enough to
prove the nonmarginality of the utopian tradition in America. Owen
was a man of some importance, and this may be adequate as an
explanation for his American triumph. But one may also agree with
Bestor that some of Owen's preoccupations were shared by the Ameri-
cans with whom he spoke. This shared concern may have provided ad-
ditional reason for their interest in Owenism. Owen was committed to
the idea of the small community as the basic unit of society, a family of
34. Id.
35. Id. at 111.
36. Id.
37. The text of Owen's speeches appeared in the National Intelligencer and were then printed
as pamphlets. A. BESTOR. supra note 17, at 112.
38. Id. at 113.
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from 300 to 2,000 forming a link in a system of such families.39 This
idea of federated small units had deep resonances with certain ideas in
American political life. New Harmony itself died after a few years. But
discussion of the images that Owen put forward, which inevitably
raised issues of the relations between federated units, small groups and
larger structures, minorities and majorities, continued.
Robert Owen's thinking may be explored in a variety of ways in
the American setting. In 1972, for example, Merle Curti suggested that
one could consider the influence of Owen and the Owenite community,
New Harmony, on the "American career" of such ideas as communi-
tarianism, cooperation, and socialism.40 One could also, he said, con-
sider such things as "family, education, sex relations and religion."4
Another approach would be to identify the relationships between the
main tenets of Owenism and the "basic traditions and values in the
American experience. 41 2 One such relationship would be the idea of
Owen's secular millennialism and the sort of millennialism found in
America. Another relationship would be the issue of Owenism and the
general American belief in "the feasibility of nonviolent social change"
and "a related belief in the possibility of an easily achievable social
harmony. ' 43 As to the idea of a nonviolent social change, Curti adds
that change would come "through the contagious influence of success-
ful small social experiments and demonstrations. 44 This idea of the
inevitable spread of the (successful) social experiment marks Owenite
thought.
While the nature of the transition itself is not detailed, the before
and after pictures are clear in Owenite writing. Thus:
39. See discussion in R. OWEN. REPORT TO THE COUNTY OF LANARK AND A NEW VIEW OF
SOCIETY 226 (V. Gatrell reprint ed. 1970) (lst ed. 1821).
40. Curti, supra note 9, at 56.
41. Id. It is in the history of communitarianism or utopian socialism that Owen is remembered
and known today, and this was also largely true in the early 1820s. But, as Bestor notes, by the
"end of the 1820's Owenism was identified in the public mind less with communitarianism, than
with free thought." A. BESTOR, supra note 17, at 228.
Bestor writes that the memory of speeches at the capitol in 1825 was largely obliterated in
1829 by his debate with Alexander Campbell in Cincinnati. This debate was designed, as Owen
stated, "to prove that the principles of all religions are erroneous, and that their practice is injuri-
ous to the human race." Id.; see M. MARTY, THE INFIDEL (1961); Madden & Madden, The Great
Debate: Alexander Campbell vs. Robert Owen, 18 TRANSACTIONS CHARLES S. PEIRCE SoC'Y 207-
26 (1982).
42. Curti, supra note 9, at 56.
43. Id. at 57.
44. Id.
[Vol. 21:979
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IN THE OLD IMMORAL WORLD...
The governments have been formed by the necessities of
the periods when they were respectively established, when men
were ignorant and inexperienced, and when the animal
propensities alone directed and governed the human race.
IN THE NEW MORAL WORLD...
The governments will be formed to proceed in the most
open and direct course to give a new and highly superior char-
acter to the population of the world, and to surround the pop-
ulation in all climates, with new and highly superior external
circumstances or arrangements; by which health of body and
mind will be insured, and thereby, the gradual improvement of
the race; by which the injurious distinctions of color and form
shall be made to cease; by which one interest shall be made
evident to, and be pursued by all; by which one language will,
of necessity, soon be desired, written, and spoken; by which
wars will cease, and national revenues will become useless or
be easily obtained; by which the continuance of private prop-
erty will be seen to be an evil of enormous magnitude, and will
be, in consequence, eagerly relinquished by all; by which the
various opposing religions of faith, which make men irrational,
will die a natural death, and be succeeded by the simple reli-
gion of pure charity, which will cover the earth as the waters
cover the sea, and induce all men to adopt the system of pub-
lic property; by which falsehood shall be forever abandoned,
and truth shall be universally established; and by which this
earth shall, indeed, become a terrestrial paradise, and all its
inhabitants a race of highly intelligent, moral, and superior
beings.45
Owen's speech to the Congress illustrates his belief that, since only per-
suasion was required, the road to success lay in gaining the commit-
ment of men in power. Owen, Miliband says, "inherited the belief of
eighteenth century thought in the benevolent despot as the agent of
social change. ' 46
45. 28 The New Moral World 222 (May 9, 1835).
46. Miliband, The Politics of Robert Owen, 15 J. HIST. IDEAS 233, 235 (1954).
R.H. Tawney noted that, "[a]s far as the methods of its establishment was concerned. Owen's
Socialism, like Saint-Simon's very different version, was that of authoritarian genus." Tawney.
Robert Owen, in THE RADICAL TRADITION 38 (R. Hinden ed. 1964). Owen first thought in terms
of a "gift of enlightened rulers"; he later thought in terms, not of a political process, but of some
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To the extent that Owen's thought was federalist, it is assumed
that he was influenced by the ideas of his associate, the scientist Wil-
liam Maclure.47 As Bestor has noted, the
success of the federal system in the United States encouraged
[Maclure] to hope that "thousands, or hundreds of thousands
of small societies" might exist, separate yet federated, and
might "traffic and deal with each other in the true spirit of
equality, . . . exchanging labor for labor, without permitting
avarice to introduce its poison in the form of coin .... "'I"
Moreover, those societies would not counteract or injure one another.""
Maclure was particularly impressed with the traditional federalist
justification of the possibility of experimentation in the local groups.
Maclure noted that "[e]ach township might experiment on every thing
that could conduce to their comfort and happiness, without interfering
with the interests of their neighbors." 50 If a failure resulted, that fail-
ure "could only hurt the contrivers and executors of the speculation,
forcing them to nullify their mistakes, and guaranteeing them against a
perseverance in error. '51 Maclure included several short discussions on
issues of representation and small size in his Opinions-discussions
echoing familiar themes in American political discourse.
But there are differences, it seems, between Owen's emphasis and
Maclure's. While based on small groups, Owen's federalism does not
stress experiment.52 Where Maclure's conception is dynamic-includ-
sort of "revolution of the human mind directed solely by truth, by charity, and by kindness." Id.
at 38-39. On either assumption, Tawney writes, "the ordinary political processes, by which abuses
are corrected and reform was introduced, were dismissed by him as irrelevant or worse." Id. at 39.
This process of establishment is linked to the issue of what is established. In effect, the truth
(Owen's experiment having established it) is given.
47. William Maclure (1763-1840) was a Scottish-born scientist who, like Owen, created his
own fortune early and became interested in educational theory. He was one of those in the
"boatload of knowledge," which was organized to join Owen in 1825. Maclure later broke with
Owen over Owen's handling of the community and established his school as an independent entity.
A. BESTOR, supra note 17, at 190-91. "As Owen's project withered away, Maclure's was coming
into flower." Id. at 200. Maclure's school and the school press, which published a number of
scientific volumes, as well as Maclure's Opinions on Various Subjects, continued for some time.
48. A. BESTOR, supra note 17, at 152 (quoting Maclure).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 14.
51. Id.
52. Owen did make some references to experiments in his talk to the American Congress,
particularly to his own experiments (leading to his particular result) and to the "imperfect experi-
ments of the Moravians, Shakers, and Harmonites." Address by Robert Owen (Feb. 25, 1825),
reprinted in 0. JOHNSON, ROBERT OWEN IN THE UNITED STATES 32 (1970) [hereinafter Address
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ing the possibility of failure and error-Owen's "federalism," greatly
tempered by paternalism and centralism, is not. 3 Owen was, in gen-
eral, considerably more certain of the universal applicability of his own
vision than is characteristic of pluralists.5 '
These points can be illustrated by Owen's presentation to the
American Congress.5 5 In announcing the establishment of his new com-
munity at New Harmony, Owen was also saying that those who saw it
would, of necessity, be converted to his approach instantly and without
conflict. "I have been asked," he said, "what would be the effect upon
the neighborhood and surrounding country, where one or more of these
societies of union, co-operation, and common property, should be estab-
lished? ' ' 56 Owen's answer was the following:
My conviction is, that, from necessity and inclination, the in-
dividual or old system of society, would break up, and soon
terminate; from necessity, because the new societies would un-
dersell all individual producers . . . from inclination, because
it is scarcely to be supposed that anyone would continue to live
under the miserable, anxious, individual system of opposition
and counteraction, when they could with ease form themselves
into, or become members of, one of these associations of
union, intelligence, and kind feeling. 7
of Feb. 25, 1825].
His view of his own system was that it was an experiment that could not fail itself and could
not fail to be the basis of a new system, "unless we can imagine that there are human beings who
prefer sin and misery to virtue and happiness." Id. at 35.
53. See Adamiak, State and Society in Early Socialist Thought, 26 SURVEY 1 (1982); Cla-
eys, supra note 20. See generally A. BESTOR, supra note 17; G. COLE. ROBERT OWEN (1925): J
HARRISON, supra note 17; G. LOCKWOOD, supra note 26.
54. Owen's temperamental predisposition is captured in the comment of his father-in-law:
"Thou needest to be very right for thou art very positive." R. OWE.. TIE LIFE OF ROBERT OWEN
BY HIMSELF 99 (1920).
55. Addresses by Robert Owen (Feb. 25, 1825 & Mar. 7, 1825), reprinted in 0. JoHiNsoN,
supra note 52, at 21-64.
56. Address by Robert Owen (Mar. 7, 1825), reprinted in 0. JOhNSON. supra note 52, at 52
[hereinafter Address of Mar. 7, 1825].
57. Id. The Noyes chapter "Inquest on New Harmony," see J. NOYES, supra note 26, at 44-
58, includes some comments of members of the Oneida community who read the Noyes chapter
and then discussed it at an evening meeting. One said:
The people Mr. Owen had to deal with in Scotland were of the servile class, employees in
his cotton-factories, and were easily managed, compared with those he collected here in
the United States. When he went to Indiana, and undertook to manage a family of a
thousand democrats, he began to realize that he did not understand human nature, or the
principles of Association.
Id. at 53 (quoting S.R. Leonard). Along similar lines, Maclure suggested that "the materials in
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The communities would create an environment in which this result
would be inevitable. As Owen explained to the legislators:
Having discovered that individuals were always formed by the
circumstances, whatever they might be, which were allowed to
exist around them, my practice was to govern the circum-
stances; and thus by means imperceptible and unknown to the
individuals, I formed them, to the extent I could control the
circumstances, into what I wished them to become; and in this
manner were the beneficial changes effected in the population
under my care.5
Owen was also asked what the effects of these communities would
be on the government and his answer was this:
[The communities] are in complete union with the principles
on which the constitution of this country is founded. The con-
stitution is essentially a government of the union of indepen-
dent states, acting together for their mutual benefit. The new
communities would stand in the same relation to their respec-
tive State Governments, that the States do now to the General
Government . . ..
Two observations are worth stressing about Owen's view of the re-
lationship between his communities and the outside government. First,
Owen envisions what we would call a private form, the voluntary asso-
ciation or corporation, turning into a unit within a governmental hier-
archy, rather in the tradition of the Massachusetts Bay Company.00
His suggestion evokes the early history of the corporation with its em-
phasis on the public or quasi-governmental aspects of the form. 1 Sec-
this country are not the same as in the cotton spinners at New Lanark, nor does the advice of a
patron go so far." J. HARRISON, supra note 17, at 37 (quoting remarks of Maclure).
58. Address of Feb. 25, 1825, supra note 52, at 27.
59. Address of Mar. 7, 1825, supra note 56, at 53.
60. John Winthrop and others
met somewhere in Cambridge University, of which most of them were alumni, in August
of 1629 and signed an agreement to emigrate to New England within seven months,
provided they could carry over the government and charter of the Massachusetts Bay
Company. The reason for this important proviso was to protect themselves from the king,
who otherwise might confiscate their charter, as had happened to the Virginia Company
only five years earlier. And it so happened, whether by chance or design, that the Massa-
chusetts Bay Charter did not require the stockholders to meet in any particular place.
The stockholders voted for the transfer and elected John Winthrop governor.
S. MoRIsoN, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 65 (1965).
61. Owen's description of the New Harmony enterprise makes plain that, at one level, it is
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ond, while Owen referred to American political federalism, no one at
the time he spoke was entirely certain what the relation of the central
government to the states really was. When Owen said that he wanted
the communities to be as states in their relations to a larger unit, he
raised more issues than he perhaps appreciated. The nature of the fed-
eral union itself was far from clear, and the United States was, in a
sense, as much an experiment as any utopian community."'
II. MINORITIES
I would not have any one adopt my mode of living on any
account;for, beside that before he has fairly learned it I may
have found out another for myself, I desire that there may be
as many different persons in the world as possible; but I
would have each one be very careful to find out and pursue
his own way, and not his father's or his mother's or his neigh-
bor's instead.
-H.D. Thoreau"3
The problem of minorities can exist no matter how small the rele-
vant community. Pushed to its extreme, it becomes the problem of
individual sovereignty, since the individual can be the minority in rela-
tion to the tiny community or to anything larger. The voluntary associ-
ation-or nonstate "interest group"-can be the minority in relation to
some part of government, and the individual federated state can be the
minority in relation to the central government. We can use language of
conceived as a private undertaking, a corporation, or a voluntary association.
I am prepared to commence the system on my own private responsibility, or with partners
having the same principles and feelings with myself; or by joint stock companies, under
an act of incorporation from the state governments of Indiana and Illinois, in which the
new properties which I have purchased, with a view to these establishments, are situ-
ated-or, by a general incorporated company, formed of the leading persons in each
state, who could easily form arrangements by which the benefit of the system might ba
obtained, with the least loss of time, by all the inhabitants within each Government,
belonging to the Union.
Address of Feb. 25, 1825, supra note 52, at 33. On the history of the corporation, see B. RUDDEN.
THE NEW RIVER 1-6 (1985).
62. Thus, Kenneth Stampp has said that, "[b]y the end of the 1820s, after the government
under the federal Constitution had been in operation for forty years, the prevailing view of the
Union in the political rhetoric of the time still remained that of an experiment." K, STA.iPP. TiE
IMPERILED UNION 29 (1980). He argues that "a substantial case for perpetual Union was not
devised until several decades after the adoption of the Constitution." Preface to Id. at viii. On the
idea of experimentation, see generally P. NAGEL. ONE NATION INDIVISIBLE 13-31 (1964).
63. WALDEN 64 (Modern Library ed. 1950) (1st ed. 1854).
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sovereignty with reference to individual sovereignty as much as to na-
tion-state sovereignty. 4
Viewing the matter broadly, one sees that Owen and others con-
cerned with groups are flanked on both sides by those concerned with
either the state or the individual. Of those concerned with either groups
or individuals, only some are centrally focused on questions of minori-
ties, differences, or pluralism. Owen, as noted, was not. But Calhoun
and the Indians are well-known among those whom we now associate
with pluralist concerns.
We have some record of the conversation between Owen and Cal-
houn in a brief account of Calhoun's response to Owen from Owen's
companion, Donald MacDonald. (When MacDonald met Harrison and
Calhoun, the latter "remarked that he felt great interest in Mr. Owen's
proceedings & thought that there were now at work in the world some
active principles which gave assurance of important improvements in
society being very near at hand. '65 ) The discussion that follows is,
therefore, not found in any narrative record of interaction between
Owen and Calhoun; in effect, what is provided is the other half of the
imaginary conversations that began with Owen's presentation of his
new view of society. Calhoun's thought leads us to an idea of pluralism
that sees a group interest-in his case, a pro-slavery interest-as fun-
damentally important.66
64. In doing this, we can attribute sovereignty to everything in between. Today, we tend to
speak more of legitimacy than of sovereignty, but, as Ernest Gellner notes in a clever paraphrase,
"[r]oughly speaking, legitimacy is sovereignty recollected in tranquillity." E. GELLNER, LEGITIMA-
TION OF BELIEF 24 (1974). There is an argument that small communities (assuming that they pass
the Austinian test of numbers--"considerable" or "not extremely minute") might be sovereign in
Austinian terms, even though located within another state. This argument can be made by an
analogy to the feeble but sovereign state that obeys the rare commands of the more powerful
state. See J. AUSTIN, Lecture VI, in 1 LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF
POSITIVE LAWS 223 (R. Campbell ed. 1885). This would work best for the nineteenth century, on
the theory that the larger state made few demands. Cf. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982
Term-Fdreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983) (on law creation by internal
groups); Weisbrod, Family, Church and State: An Essay on Constitutionalism and Religious
Authority, 26 J. FAM. L. 741 (1987-1988) (for a discussion of pluralism in this sense and for the
material on legal and political pluralism cited there).
Today, we may want to say that groups have a role in shaping official law (i.e. pressure
groups that file amicus briefs) and also in translating, enforcing, and recreating law. See, e.g.,
Givelber, Bowers & Blitch, Tarasoff, Myth & Reality: An Empirical Study of Private Law In
Action, 1984 WIs. L. REv. 443.
65. D. MACDONALD, THE DIARIES OF DONALD MACDONALD 1824-1826, at 329 (C. Shedeker
ed. 1942); see also Bestor, Book Review, N.Y. HIsT. 80-86 (1943).
66. Calhoun (1782-1850) studied at Yale and the Litchfield School of Law, served in Con-
gress until 1817, was then appointed Secretary of War by Monroe, and was Secretary of War
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Calhoun's version of localism, found in the South Carolina Exposi-
tion and Protest, was first addressed to the Tariff Act of 1828.17 The
exposition argued that the state had a legal right to "refuse obedience
to a national act when the state deemed the act to be contrary to the
Constitution."68 Calhoun's argument was directed essentially against
the tyranny of the majority and was designed to protect the minority
interest of the southern states-without secession. 9
when he met Owen. Calhoun was Vice President from 1825 to 1832 under John Quincy Adams
and Andrew Jackson and finally became a Senator from South Carolina. He is largely
remembered as having devoted his career to the cause of state's rights and the defense of slavery.
See generally L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADmON IN AMERICA (1955); R_ HoFsTADTERt TIlE
AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1948); C. MERRIAM. A HISTORY OF AM1ERICAN POLITICAL
THEORIES 267-304 (1909); A. SPAIN. THE POUTICAL THEORY OF JOHtN C CALIOUN (1968);
Kateb, The Majority Principle: Calhoun and His Antecedents, 84 POL ScI Q 583 (1969); Mer-
riam, The Political Philosophy of John C. Calhoun, in STUDIES IN SOUTHERN HISTORY AND
POLICS 319-64 (2d ed. 1964) (1st ed. 1914).
67. Here is de Tocqueville's brisk summary of the facts of the tariff controversy: "The wars of
the French Revolution and of 1812 had created manufacturing establishments in the North of the
Union, by cutting off free communication between America and Europe." I A. DE TOCQUEVILLE.
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 427 (Vintage ed. 1960).
When peace was concluded and the channel of intercourse reopened by which the pro-
duce of Europe was transmitted to the New World, the Americans thought fit to establish
a system of import duties for the twofold purpose of protecting their incipient manufac-
tures and of paying off the amount of the debt contracted during the war. The Southern
states, which have no manufactures to encourage and which are exclusively agricultural,
soon complained of this measure ....
As early as 1820 South Carolina declared in a petition to Congress that the tariff
law was "unconstitutional, oppressive, and unjust". . . . But Congress. far from lending
an ear to these complaints, . . . raised the scale of tariff duties in the years in the years
1824 and 1828 and recognized anew the principle on which it was founded. A doctrine
was then proclaimed, . . . which took the name of Nullification.
Id. at 427-28. Tocqueville then comments that this doctrine would, in principle, destroy the fed-
eral bond and actually bring back that anarchy from which the Constitution of 1789 delivered the
Americans. Id. at 428. Tocqueville had earlier noted that "li]n America the liberty of association
for political purposes is unlimited," using the tariff-free trade controversy as an example. Id. at
200-01. "It must be acknowledged," he wrote, "that the unrestrained liberty of political associa-
tion has not hitherto produced in the United States the fatal results that might perhaps be ex-
pected from it elsewhere." Id. at 201. He concluded that "[alt the present time the liberty of
association has become a necessary guarantee against the tyranny of the majority." Id. at 201-02.
68. Post, Introduction to J. CALHOUN. A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT at xiv (C. Post ed.
1953) (quoting Calhoun).
69. The idea of the "tyranny of majority," see A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 67, at 276.
was familiar earlier to readers of The Federalist. "It is of great importance in a republic, not only
to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of society against
the injustice of the other part." THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison), quoted in A. DE TOCQUE-
VILLE, supra note 67, at 279-80.
One can speculate on the impact of Connecticut politics-and the feelings that resulted in the
Hartford Convention-on Calhoun's later work. See Carroll, Calhoun and His Nullification Doc-
trine, 70 LIVING AGE 444-46 (1861). "Calhoun derived his first treasonable ideas of nullification
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Calhoun's developed doctrine for reconciling majority and minor-
ity interests, often referred to as a doctrine of the "concurrent major-
ity," has been summarized this way:
The numerical majority consisting of men subject to self-
centeredness . . . can be tyrannical and oppressive in the area
of a self-centered minority's rights and interests . . . .[There-
fore] each sectional majority or each major-interest majority
should have the constitutional power to veto acts of the federal
government, which represented the numerical majority, when
those acts were deemed, by a majority of the people compris-
ing the section or interest, to be adverse to the welfare of the
section or interest.70
The emphasis on state, sectional, or interest-group difference, in
fact on difference, is clear. But, of course, Calhoun remains a problem.
"What weight ought to be attached, then, to the views of the late John
C. Calhoun, whose consecration of his life to the defense of slavery
should not blind his countrymen to his great ability?" Theodore Wool-
sey began his discussions of Calhoun's ideas of representation with a
kind of apology.7
One reading of Calhoun in American history puts him and his
concerns clearly in the past. 2 Yet for those interested in groups and
associations, Calhoun becomes an important figure. Thus, Alexander
Pekelis wrote that, while "[t]he monistic conception has under various
forms proclaimed that there has been but one law, the law of the state,
and secession from the Hartford Convention. ... Id. at 444. Thus, it has been said that "[njot
the South, not slavery, but Yale College and Litchfield Law School made Calhoun a nullifier." M.
COIT, JOHN C. CALHOUN: AMERICAN PORTRAIT 42 (1950). Gordon Post notes that Calhoun stud-
ied with the federalist Timothy Dwight at Yale, noting that Dwight, "along with many other New
Englanders in the early nineteenth century proposed secession as a solution for sectional conflict."
Introduction to J. CALHOUN, supra note 68, at viii.
70. Post, Introduction to J. CALHOUN, supra note 68, at xxii.
71. 2 T. WOOLSEY, POLITICAL SCIENCE: OR THE STATE THEORETICALLY AND PRACTICALLY
CONSIDERED 292 (1877).
72. See R. GABRIEL, THE COURSE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 103-10 (1940).
Richard Hofstadter included a chapter on Calhoun entitled "John C. Calhoun: The Marx of the
Master Class" in The American Political Tradition. See R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 66, at 67-
91. Hofstadter believed that Calhoun's concepts of nullification and the concurrent voice "have
little more than antiquarian interest for the twentieth-century mind." Id. at 68. For him, the point
is that, "[b]efore Karl Marx published The Communist Manifesto, Calhoun laid down an analysis
of American politics and the sectional struggle which foreshadowed some of the seminal ideas of
the Marx's system." Id. Robert Dahl cites Calhoun as someone whose ideas anticipated modern
consociationalism. See R. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 260 (1989).
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and that there is but one government, the government of the state,"
still "there has been no generation and no country which did not count
among its best legal minds one or more opponents to this monistic the-
ory." 3 Pekelis listed Calhoun among the thinkers who "approached the
problem from different angles," but were all essentially pluralistic. 74
The different angles Pekelis named included the idea of concurrent
majority.7 5
The Chickasaw and Choctaw chiefs were in Washington in the fall
and early winter of 1824-1825 to negotiate the terms of their removal
from Mississippi to Oklahoma.76 As Secretary of War, Calhoun was
directly concerned with this enterprise. As in the case of Owen and
Calhoun, we have no transcript of the conversation between Owen and
the Indians. But again we have an account from a companion of
Owen's, this time, his son. According to William Owen, his father cau-
tioned the chiefs against adopting what had been found to be injurious
in civilized life.
[He] said that he had come more than three thousand miles to
promote plans, by which he hoped to make the red brethren
superior to the whites. He said the Indians taken when young
amongst white, would become like whites, and vice versa and
he concluded that it would be possible to unite the good in the
Indian and in the civilized lives, so as to make a being supe-
rior to both.
Robert Owen specifically addressed the Indians on the issue of separa-
tism, but, on the basis of William Owen's account, the answer was not
entirely responsive. William Owen writes:
He was desirous of knowing whether the Indians would prefer
amalgamating with the whites, or forming a separate body
quite distinct from them. The Indian replied that he was
aware that the whites were so superior to them that they could
only cope with them by imitating them, which they were en-
deavoring to do as well as possible, tho' still a great way
73. Pekelis, Private Governments and the Federal Constitution, in LAW AND SOCIAL AcTioN
104 (1950).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. A. DERoSIER, supra note 32, at 80-84.
77. W. OWEN, DIARY OF WILLAM OWEN 43-44 (J. Hiatt ed. 1906).
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behind.78
The conversation that we imagine between Calhoun and Owen
uses the language of concurrent majorities and rests on the empirical
point that the local forms will not be identical or committed to the
same values.7 9 The conversation that we imagine between the Indians
and Owen in which Owen expounds his new view, and the Indians
stress the autonomy of the Indian nation,80 rests on the same point.
There is no discussion here of the history of government and the
Indians. Nor does this piece do more than acknowledge John Calhoun's
role as Secretary of War in the Indian removal.81 The Indian tribes are
considered, not because their history may or may not reveal effective
power or self-governance in the early nineteenth century in relation to
the American government, but because they can be seen as represent-
ing the permanent (or at least indefinite) existence of the small group
within the larger one. The emphasis is on the concession by the formal
governmental structure of the special status of the Indians, conveyed in
the suggestive language of Felix Cohen: "The decisions on Indian title
can hardly be understood unless it is recognized that dealings between
the Federal Government and the Indian tribes have regularly been han-
78. Id. at 43.
79. Calhoun did not work out the problems of minorities within the sectional minorities.
Kariel concludes that Calhoun "was wrong in attributing homogeneity to the sections." H.
KARIEL. THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN PLURALISM 152 (1961). See generally L. HARTZ, supra note
66, at 145-77 (discussion of tensions in Calhoun's ideas).
Calhoun sees that the case of the individual as the source of the veto is the extreme case. For
a discussion of this system in Poland, see J. CALHOUN, supra note 68, at 54-55. It is not clear
what Calhoun thought the role of different voices within the section, interest, or community should
be. For a linkage of Thoreau and Calhoun, see R. GABRIEL, supra note 72. "Calhoun enlarged
Thoreau's individual into a section, an interest group. ... Id. at 110; cf. A. VINCENT, supra
note 8, at 23 (Vincent sees group theory as a variation of individualist theory).
80. This is not the place to review the history of the Indians and the law in America. Perhaps
it is enough to say that their status over time has been anomalous and difficult. At the same time,
they have*represented a leading example of the continuation of ideas of group authority, at least
over group members. For recent treatments, see Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1; see also C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW
(1987); Resnik. Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI.
L. REv. 671 (1989).
81. Of course, as in the case of slavery, Calhoun's policies in relation to the Indians were not
consonant with his ideas of minority interest to the extent that he argued against preserving the
Indians as separate legal nations. He believed that, "[bly a proper combination of force and per-
suasion of punishments and rewards, they ought to be brought within the pales of law and civiliza-
tion." A. DERosIER, supra note 32, at 41 (quoting Calhoun). Like the proposal to replace the
manners and customs of the Indians with the Constitution and laws of the United States, this is
the language of assimilation, not pluralism. Id. at 42.
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dled as part of our international relations.""2 As in the case of Cal-
houn, Owen met with people who are associated with pluralist ideas in
American history. If Owen had explained his new view of a (uniform)
society to the Indian tribal leaders, they might well have responded by
presenting a world in which a small semi-autonomous 3 community was
functioning under the protection of a larger political unit with possibly
different values.8 4
This emphasis on permanent diversity is not Owenite, nor is it a
characteristic of Enlightenment thinking, which is a major source of
Owenite views. As Harrison noted, there are pronounced intellectual
rigidities in Owenism, derived from Enlightenment ideas: "Men and
their beliefs would become simplified and standardized by the applica-
tion of rational principles, and diversity-far from being a mark of ex-
cellence-would be greatly reduced." 5
America, before the Civil War, also exhibited a number of exam-
ples of radical individualism, which were not focused on communitari-
anism or politics at all. A digression into this material is needed to
make the point that political theory that focused more on individual
rights than Owen did was not necessarily more attentive to the problem
of difference.
"Seen from a lower point of view, the Constitution, with all its
faults, is very good," ' Thoreau wrote.
[T]he law and the courts are very respectable; even this State
and this American government are, in many respects, very ad-
mirable, and rare things, to be thankful for, such as a great
many have described them; but seen from a point of view a
little higher, they are what I have described them; seen from a
higher still, and the highest, who shall say what they are, or
that they are worth looking at or thinking of at all?87
82. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REv. 28. 43 (1947).
83. For a discussion of semi-autonomous groups, see S. MOORE, LAw AS PROCESS (1978).
84. For one approach, see R. NOziCK. ANARCHY. STATE & UTOPIA 297-334 (1974) (Chapter
10 entitled "A Framework for Utopia").
85. J. HARRISON, supra note 17, at 188. Harrison also noted, however, that, "[o]n the surface,
Owenite communities seemed to be very tolerant." Id.; see also L HARTZ, supra note 66 (on the
difference issue in Locke). "Locke has a hidden conformitarian germ to begin with, since natural
law tells equal people equal things . I. " d. at 11.
86. H.D. THOREAU. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1849), in WALDEN AND OTHER WRITINCS OF
HENRY DAVID THOREAU 656 (Modern Library ed. 1950).
87. Id. "[T]he government does not concern me much," Thoreau continued, "[ilt is not many
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And Thoreau expressed his views on reform:
As for adopting the ways which the state has provided for
remedying the evil, I know not of such ways. They take too
much time, and a man's life will be gone. I have other affairs
to attend to. I came into this world, not chiefly to make this a
good place to live in, but to live in it, be it good or bad.""
But the individualism of Thoreau was not the only individualism nine-
teenth-century America had to offer. We can illustrate with Josiah
Warren and Lysander Spooner. 9
Josiah Warren, once of New Harmony,90 was interested in com-
munitarian anarchism based on the idea of individual sovereignty. One
can, in this case, offer material indicating that Warren was interested
in diversity and individualism in the sense of serious differences be-
tween people. Thus, he wrote:
I do not mean to be understood that all are of one mind. On
the contrary, in a progressive state there is no demand for con-
formity. We build on Individuality; any difference between us
confirms our position. Differences, therefore, like the admissi-
moments that I live under a government, even in this world." Id.
88. Id. at 644-45. Thoreau's Walden can be seen as either a fictional or a practical experimen-
tal utopia. For a discussion of Walden as a fictional utopia, see Frye, Varieties of Literary Uto-
pias, in UTOPIAS AND UTOPIAN THOUGHT 46-47 (F. Manuel ed. 1966); for a reference to Walden
as a practical experimental utopia, see E. BATALOV, THE AMERICAN UTOPIA 84 (1985). On
Walden and Thoreau's travel reading-he had "traveled a good deal in Concord"-see J. CHRIS-
TIE, THOREAU AS WORLD TRAVELER 215 (1965).
89. On Lysander Spooner (1808-1887), see Shively, Biography to 2 L. SPOONER, THE COL-
LECTED WORKS OF LYSANDER SPOONER 15-62 (1971). See 17 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIoG-
RAPHY 466-67 (1935); 18 THE NATIONAL CYLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 419-20 (1922);
see also 1 T. SPOONER, RECORDS OF WILLIAM SPOONER OF PLYMOUTH, MASS., & His DESCEND-
ANTS 581-82 (1883). Spooner's natural law position included an attack on the state licensing of
lawyers in 1835.
90. Josiah Warren (1789-1874) joined the Owenite community at New Harmony after hear-
ing Owen speak in Ohio. Later, he formed his own anarchist communities. For a comparison of
Owenite ideas and those of Warren, see W. BAILIE. JOSIAH WARREN 6-7, 123-26 (1906), Bailie's
chapter "Josiah Warren," in G. LOCKWOOD, supra note 26, at 295-97, and Shuster, Native Amer-
ican Anarchism, 17 SMITH C. STUD. HIsT. 94-97 (Oct. 1931-July 1932).
For a discussion of federalist ideas in the anarchist tradition, see Woodcock, Anarchism: A
Historical Introduction, in THE ANARCHIST READER 25-26 (G. Woodcock ed. 1977). For a gen-
eral treatment, see A. RITTER, ANARCHISM: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS (1980).
Warren was once described as a "musician, inventor, and all round genius . . .perhaps the
brightest mind in the community." J. MARTIN, MEN AGAINST THE STATE: THE ExPOSITORS OF
INDIVIDUALIST ANARCHISM IN AMERICA, 1827-1908, at 8 n.23 (3d ed. 1970) (1st ed. 1953) (quot-
ing Jacob Dunn).
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ble discords in music, are a valuable part of our harmony!91
But the repeated references to music, and the notion of admissible dis-
cord, suggest not only Warren as a musician, band leader of New Har-
mony, but also Warren who believed fundamentally that, given the
right sort of education, most people would make disciplined, correct
choices and that conflict would be radically minimized through
education.92
While Warren is remembered as part of the American utopian or
communitarian tradition, Lysander Spooner is cited as part of an indig-
enous anarchist or libertarian tradition in America.9 3 He is also occa-
sionally recalled in relation to his operation of a private mail service in
competition with the federal post office. 4 Lysander Spooner's position
on sovereignty is elaborated in his late work, A Letter to Grover
Cleveland:
The only real "sovereignty," or right of "sovereignty," in this
or any other country, is that right of sovereignty which each
and every human being has over his or her own person and
property, so long as he or she obeys the one law of justice
towards the person and property of every other human being.
This is the only natural right of sovereignty, that was ever
known among men. All other so-called rights of sovereignty
are simply the usurpations of impostors, conspirators, robbers,
tyrants, and murderers.95
91. J. NOYES, supra note 26, at 98 (quoting Warren's A Peep into Utopia); see also J. WAR-
REN, TRUE CIVILIZATION: AN IMMEDIATE NECESSITY AND THE LAST GROUND OF HOPE FOR MAN-
KIND 18 (B. Franklin ed. 1967) (1st ed. 1863) ("No subordination can be more perfect than that
of an Orchestra; but it is all voluntary.").
92. G. LOCKWOOD, supra note 26, at 295. The present suggestion is that some thinkers, like
Owen, Spooner, or Warren, whose ideas are rooted in natural law or enlightenment approaches,
are concerned with variety, rather than difference. Issues of "interests" go deeper and overlap
questions of "difference," which are now discussed often in the context of feminism. See the work
of Martha Minow. See, e.g., Minow, Pluralisms, 21 CONN. L REV. 965 (1989).
93. G. WOODCOCK. ANARCHISM: A HIsTORY OF LIBERTARIAN IDEAS AND MOVF,.tENTS 459-60
(1962). On anarchist and antinomian traditions from Anne Hutchinson through Noyes, Warren,
Benjamin Tucker, Lysander Spooner, and the immigrant radicals, see D, DE LEON, TrE AMERI-
CAN AS ANARCHIST (1978). See also J. MARTIN, supra note 90. Note that "undesirables" of War-
ren's community, Modern Times, were "let alone" and "usually" left. See Id. at 85. In short, the
structure assumed a certain consensus.
94. See United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 574 F.2d 712, 717 n.l 1 (1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1115 (1979) ("In reaching our conclusion, we do not overlook the paper of Lysander
Spooner on 'The Unconstitutionality of the Laws of Congress Prohibiting Private Mails,' pub-
lished in 1844. ... ).
95. L. SPOONER. A LETrER To GROVER CLEVELAND 86 (1886); cf. B. PASCAL. PENSNES No.
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Law meant natural, universal, unalterable law. This was Spooner's
argument for some decades, reflected in pamphlets, books, and en-
counters with government agencies. 6 Here we see a position, like
Owen's, that is not focused on pluralism, though it stresses individual
294 (W. Thayer ed. 1965) (1st ed. 1670) ("On what shall man found the order of the world which
he would govern? . . . Shall it be on justice? Man is ignorant of it."). As to Marshall, Spooner
said that
John Marshall has the reputation of having been the greatest jurist the country has ever
had. And he unquestionably would have been a great jurist, if the two fundamental prop-
ositions, on which all his legal, political, and constitutional ideas were based, had been
true. These propositions were, first, that government has all power; and, secondly, that
the people have no rights.
L. SPOONER, supra, at 87.
96. Spooner's position on law and natural law elicited a strong response and critique from
Wendell Phillips on the nature of law. See W. PHILLIPS. REVIEW OF LYSANDER SPOONER'S ESSAY
ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY (Boston 1847). Spooner argued that "law is an intel-
ligible principle of right, necessarily resulting from the nature of man; and not an arbitrary rule,
that can be established by mere will, numbers or power," L. SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL-
ITY OF SLAVERY 5 (B. Franklin ed. 1965) (1st ed. 1860), and that law is "simply the rule, princi-
ple, obligation or requirement of natural justice." Id. at 6. He believed that judges should declare
slavery illegal on the basis of natural law. Wendell Phillips responded in the section of his Review
called "What Is Law?" by quoting a number of positivist definitions of law as emanating from
state authority. Phillips rejected Spooner's view of the world, emphasizing the association of law
and government, law and officials, law and the state, as part of an activist (abolitionist) position.
Phillips was afraid that Spooner's abstract (or utopian?) natural law theories would mislead
people. In short, his argument suggests that someone might have been paying attention to
Spooner's arguments in the abolitionist context. But by the time that E.V. Zenker did his research
on anarchism at the end of the nineteenth century, he reported that he was "quite unable to
procure any book or essay by [the anarchist] Tucker, or a copy of his journal Liberty." EV.
ZENKER, ANARCHISM: A CRITICISM AND HISTORY OF THE ANARCHIST THEORY at vi-vii (1897). It
is difficult to say anything specific about the influence of anarchist ideas.
Atiyah and Summers suggest that Spooner was not alone. P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 8, at 237.
[W]hatever may have been the position of classical natural law theorists such as Aristotle
and Aquinas, many American natural law thinkers did believe in a 'higher law' version of
natural law, according to which positive law contrary to natural law was simply invalid as
law or, even if valid, imposed no duty of obedience; indeed, in extreme cases, government
action contrary to natural law gave rise to the right of rebellion or revolution.
Id.
For Phillips's discussion of the problems with Blackstone's definition of law, see W. PILLIPS,
supra, at 8 n.*.
If the reader asks why we do not cite Blackstone's definition- "Municipal law is a rule
of civil conduct, prescribed by the Supreme power in a State, commanding what is right,
and prohibiting what is wrong," ... we think the last clause equivocal and superfluous,
and, if taken in its obvious sense, false.
So, says Phillips, do many others, including Austin. On the general problem, Phillips argued that
"[ihe Constitution will never be amended by persuading men that it does not need amendment."
Id. at 4; see also supra note 10.
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rights.9 7 Josiah Warren and Lysander Spooner remained committed to
the same eighteenth-century understanding of right results through
right reason (and, in Spooner's case, a self-evident natural law) that
marks so much of Owen's thinking. It was not those who are associated
with the utopian or anarchist tradition in America who best represent
the possible pluralist implications of communitarian doctrine, but
rather the slave-holder Calhoun, committed to the defense of his sec-
tion, and the Indian tribes, who would for 200 years represent a special
and anomalous case in American jurisprudence, a concededly autono-
mous (or semi-autonomous) internal group.
III. ESSENTIAL FEDERALISM
We could speak of an essential federalism of America and we
would not, of course, have in mind just forty-eight or forty-
nine American jurisdictions. We think of a wider and deeper
network composed of a plurality of legal systems enjoying an
extremely great amount of autonomy.
-Alexander Pekelisus
As A.V. Dicey remarked, federalism requires a special state of
mind on the part of the inhabitants. They must "desire union, and must
not desire unity."99 The subject has been of absorbing interest to politi-
cal theorists for some centuries and of particular interest to those coun-
tries like the United States, whose structure is federal. Often the issue
is the relative balance of power between the several parts of the federal
structure and, particularly, the relative power of the national state and
97. Spooner's arguments, thus, refer to "general principles of law and reason" and the "gcn-
eral sense of mankind," see, e.g., L. SPOONER, No TREASON: THE CON MimION OF No AumoR-
ITy 29 (1870), such principles that we all act on in courts of justice and common life. Spooner
opposed women's suffrage on the theory that no one, male or female, had the right to make laws.
Spooner, Liberty 4 (June 10, 1882) (reprinting an article appearing in the February 24, 1877
edition of the defunct New Age).
In Justice Accused, Cover noted that Spooner was not seriously concerned with the method of
the judge in any real sense. See R. COVER, supra note 10, at 157. Indeed, he was not opcrating in
the positivist legal tradition at all.
98. Legal Techniques and Political Ideologies: A Comparative Study, in LAW AND SOCIAL
ACnON 67-68 (1950). Some of Pekelis's work is directed to the issue of limitations on the power
of "private governments." Id. at 98-106.
99. Dicey, Federal Government, 1 LAW Q. REv. 80, 81 (1885); cf. Elazar, The Role of Feder-
alism in Political Integration, in FEDERALISM AND POITICAL IrEGRATnoN 13 (D. Elazar ed.
1979) (the Jimmy Durante definition-feeling that you want to go and want to stay-attributed
to Martin Diamond).
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the internal, federated states. 100 The issue of federalism has also been
of interest to jurisprudence, particularly because of its implications for
the doctrine of a single sovereignty. Thus, even John Austin was com-
pelled to consider the case of federations, including the United States,
in his work on jurisprudence.' 0'
In the United States, the question of what federalism means, in
theory or practice, or historically, is not easily answered. We see vari-
ous definitions of federalism attributed to leading figures. Hamilton is
cited for an idea that emphasizes a strong national government. Jeffer-
son and Madison are cited for the idea of a weak central government
with the power basically retained by the states. As presented by law-
yers, federalism becomes a federal structure in which the national gov-
ernment and its expositor of law, the Supreme Court, sits on top of all
the internal structures. 02 Official governmental law is seen as the only
law. Federalism is taken to refer to governmental agencies.
Other ideas were, however, real to the nineteenth century. A
school of "no-government" anarchist-individualists (including Lysander
Spooner) was active in the abolitionist movement. Thoreau rejected the
state as a matter not worthy of much concern. Even governmental mat-
ters relatively clear to us were quite open. The highest level of the legal
hierarchy could be flatly ignored by a President: "John Marshall has
made his decision: now let him enforce it!"'10 3 The comment, attributed
100. As to this, our sense of the inevitability of the present adjustment is doubtless ahistorical.
To us of the present day it seems that the Constitution framed in 1787 gave birth in 1789
to a national government such as that which now constitutes an indestructible bond of
union for the states; but the men of that time would certainly have laughed at any such
idea ....
W. WILSON, THE STATE 63 (rev. ed. 1900).
101. J. AUSTIN, supra note 64, at 261.
102. For a discussion and review of the debate over centralized and decentralized power in
fact and legal theory, see Scheiber, Federalism and Legal Process: Historical and Contemporary
Analysis of the American System, 14 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 663 (1980). See also Soifer & Macgill,
The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1168 (1977)
("Federal and state powers ebb and flow relative to one another in response to messy and mutable
social, political, and economic conditions.").
As has been noted, the images of the United States and its federalism have changed over
time. See Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980). The nineteenth-
century idea was that there were powerful states that somehow came together for certain purposes
to form a national union, whose powers were defined and limited. The concept of federalism went
along with an idea of demarcation. To a twentieth-century mind, the federated states are internal
governing structures of a larger state, not private, for they too, after all, are governmental, but
still lesser. "To the modern reader, American states seem to be, like cities, entities that are inter-
mediate between the central (federal) government and the individual." Id. at 1105 n.1 18.
103. See 1 H. GREELEY. THE AMERICAN CONFLICT 106 (1877); see also Miles, After John
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to President Andrew Jackson, reflects the tension between law and
politics, as well as the uncertainty as to the role of the Supreme Court
as the expositor of the federal Constitution as against other parts of the
federal structure.
In America, the debate over the meaning of federalism has had a
long and sometimes bloody history. "Down to the time of the Civil
War," Charles Merriam wrote, "the centers of political activity and
interest had been the state and the nation, rivals in the contest for
supremacy which finally resulted in armed conflict."'" But, Merriam
adds, "[b]ack of this struggle lay an intense interest and devotion to
the units and agencies of rural government, which had played so large
and vital a part in the early days of the colonies and of the Repub-
lic.' 10 5 These units and agencies of government, the town, the county,
had been the concern of the anti-federalists and the republicans, who
focused on shared values, small communities, small units. The alterna-
tives, posed by the Hamiltonians, were associated with centralist devel-
opment and the commitment to sovereignty in the federal government.
This idea of centralism was opposed by many, including Thomas Jeffer-
son, who became, if anything, more concerned with small units as he
became older. He wrote in 1824: "As Cato concluded every speech with
the words, Carthago delenda est, so do I every opinion, with the injunc-
tion, 'divide the counties into wards.' "106
Thus, underneath many of the historical discussions of federalism
and republicanism was a question about the correct size of the political
unit. It has been recently said: "Lost today in the legitimate characteri-
zation of the Constitution as bent on setting limits to the power exer-
cised by less than angelic men is the extent to which the Constitution is
a grant of power to a centralized nation-state."'107 Thus, Isaac
Marshall's Decision: Worcester v. Georgia and the Nullification Crisis, 39 JS. Hsrw. 519 (1973).
As is well known, the comment is said to have been made as a response to Marshall's decision in
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), holding that the state of Georgia could not
imprison missionaries who were working with the Cherokee Indians in Georgia because Indian
land was not under the jurisdiction of the state. Marshall's decision, however, was not enforced.
The missionaries stayed in jail. See U. PHILIPS. GEORGIA AND STATES RiGHrs 82-83 (1968); see
also W. McLOUGHLIN. CHEROKEES & MISSIONARIES. 1789-1839, at 264-65 (1984).
104. C. MERRIAM. AMERICAN POLTCAL IDEAS 228 (1920).
105. Id. at 229.
106. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Cartwright (June 5. 1824), quoted in H. ARENDT.
ON REVOLUTION 252 (1963). Arendt comments that this emphasis on wards is found in writing at
the end of Jefferson's life and at a time when he had withdrawn from affairs of state. Id. at 253-
54.
107. Kramnick, The "Great National Discussion". The Discourse of Politics In 1787. 45 WML
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Kramnick, suggests that, among the paradigms being used in the politi-
cal discourse of 1787, there was one which involved "the state-centered
language of power. °"108 Some of the debate over the Constitution dealt
with this issue in terms of size. How large should the republic be? The
school, known now as anti-federalist,109 urged that the size should be
small and, some add, about the size of the existing states. Late in his
life, Jefferson was urging a size smaller than that. This emphasis on the
small unit overlaps the interest, then and now, in voluntary
associations.
Faction and voluntary association, mediating structures and inter-
est groups, although they seem to be related and even, sometimes, seem
to be the same thing, are often discussed in a way that fails to clarify
whether the entities are different or whether only the values or adjec-
tives attached to the entities are different. Faction, for example, seems
to be a negative term. The terms voluntary associations and mediating
structures seem positive.
We can start with the discussion of republicanism offered by
Gordon Wood, 110 who describes an approach in which division itself is
perceived as bad. The public good is for everyone. "Since everyone in
the community was linked organically to everyone else, what was good
for the whole community was ultimately good for all the parts." '111 The
"common interest" is carefully defined by Wood as follows: It is not,
"as we might today think of it, simply the sum or consensus of the
particular interests that made up the community. It was rather an en-
tity in itself, prior to and distinct from the various private interests of
groups and individuals.""' 2 Wood goes on to explain that this is not to
say that private or competing interests were denied, they were simply
to be ignored. "[A]part from the basic conflict between governors and
people these were not to be dignified by their incorporation into formal
political theory or into any serious discussion of what ought to be.""'
The state was "'to be considered as one moral whole,'" and "interests
& MARY Q. 3, 23 (1988).
108. Id. at 24.
109. The distrust of legislative majorities and concern with small units and issues of cultural
diversity marked the arguments of the anti-federalists. See Kenyon, Men of Little Faith: The
Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative Government, 12 Wm. & MARY Q. 3, 10, 35-37
(1955).
110. G. WOOD. THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 58-59 (1969).
111. Id. at 58.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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and parties were regarded as aberrations or perversions, indeed signs of
sickness in the body politic." 1 4
The Federalist Papers present a more complicated picture. In the
essay Factions in The Federalist No. 10, Madison offered a now fa-
mous definition.
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether
amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are
united and actuated by some common impulse or passion, or
of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community."'
Reading the sentence with an emphasis on the word adverse, one might
suspect that the point is ultimately substantive. Some groups and as-
sociations are fine, but "factions" are working toward bad ends. This
reading is reinforced by the examples, which include: "[a] rage for pa-
per money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division or property,
or for any other improper or wicked project" (note also the reference to
"sinister views").11 6 In short, Factions in The Federalist No. 10 may
be seen as groups, associations, parties, and sects that are doing the
wrong things on the merits or as groups inherently adverse to the pub-
lic interest.117 Other groups, for example, those described in The Feder-
alist No. 51, are much less troublesome. There will be so .many of them
(groups, interests, sects) that they will not be dangerous. "Whilst all
authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the
society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of
citizens, that the rights of individuals or of the minority will be in little
danger from interested combinations of the majority.""1
114. Id. at 58-59. Wood notes that some nineteenth-century thinkers did, however, conceive of
factions as not only inevitable, but even desirable. Id. at 59.
115. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 17 (J. Madison) (R. Fairfield ed. 1961).
116. Id. at 23.
117. Cf. D. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 65 (1984) ("Even if a par-
ticular interest is part of the aggregate of interests, that interest as an impulse uniting and actua-
ting a group is indifferent to the aggregate. . . .Madison's definition seems to detect a factious
impulse at the heart of even a respectable lobby.").
118. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 162 (J. Madison) (R. Fairfield ed. 1961). James Luther
Adams attempted to reconcile these two essays by suggesting that the emphasis in The Federalist
No. 10 was on economic groups, while in The Federalist No. 51, Madison focused on
noneconomic and religious groups. He also suggested that "lmlisconceptions have arisen regarding
Madison's view of mediating structures because of his somewhat pejorative definition of factions
in Federalist, No. 10. . . .But Madison also saw in factions 'a salutary dispersion of power, a
protection for freedom in society against potentially tyrannical intentions of the majority.'"
Adams goes on to connect this problem with issues of church and state. See J. ADAMS, Mediating
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And finally we reach the well-known discussion of de Tocqueville
in which groups become the voluntary associations, which, while not
without their negative side, are on the whole valuable and necessary."'
Several features of de Tocqueville's discussion are initially striking. The
first is the range of groups that he saw, political associations as against
civil associations, governmental associations (townships, counties) as
against other forms of association, and private fraternal groups. The
second is the range of characteristics of these groups, from those that
are single purpose and limited in duration to those that finally become
internal states.
But for all this early discussion of group life in America, one is
tempted to say that there was, there must have been, a clear and uni-
versal sense of the official state as the final arbiter, setter of the limits,
creator and keeper of boundaries. As to this, let us consider a Missis-
sippi case of 1837.120
Fisher v. Allen upheld a married woman's capacity to own and
transfer her assets-in this case, a slave. The married woman was a
Chickasaw Indian, married according to the custom of the tribe. The
Structures and the Separation of Powers, in VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS 236 (1986); see also J.
MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 183-91 (1900), appended to Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63-72 (1946).
For a discussion of federalism and republicanism, see Tushnet, Federalism and the Tradi-
tions of American Political Theory, 19 GA. L. REV. 981 (1985). See also Sunstein, Interest
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 32 (1985) (describing republican and
pluralist conceptions of government and noting that "[t]he pluralist conception treats the republi-
can notion of a separate common good as incoherent, potentially totalitarian, or both"); D.
ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP: INTERGOVERNMENTAL CO-OPERATION IN THE NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 21-24 (1962).
119. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 67.
120. Fisher v. Allen, 3 Miss. (2 Howard) 611 (1837). The case is described (with an emphasis
on the history of married women's property issues in Mississippi) by Judith Younger. See
Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, Together with Criti-
cism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 60-61 (1981); see also Comment,
Husband and Wife: Memorandum on the Mississippi Woman's Law of 1839, 42 MICH. L. REV.
I 110, 1117-18 (1944) (discussion of the case).
"[I]t is a hypothesis worthy of consideration that from Chickasaw custom was derived the
first law giving a married woman in a common-law state any rights in her own property ....,"
Id. at 1117 (also considering the possibility that a woman who visited Louisiana and brought
community property ideas back to Mississippi with her was a source of the law).
On the later history of the slaves of the Chickasaw, see United States v. Choctaw Nation,
193 U.S. 115 (1904). The tribes were on the side of the Confederacy. The litigation concerned the
provisions of the treaty of 1866 regarding the Chickasaw freedmen, ignored by both the Indians
and the government. For a discussion of this case, see Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and
Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: The U.S. Supreme Court, 1888-1921, in CORPORATIONS AND
SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 170-71 (W. Samuels & A. Miller eds. 1987).
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slave was given to a daughter. A year after the gift, the legislature
passed a law abolishing the tribal character of the Indians, abolishing
tribal laws and customs, and conferring on the Indians the rights of
citizenship. Marriages between Indians were validated. The court held
that the slave could not be seized to satisfy the debts of the husband,
since the slave belonged to the wife, and the gift to the daughter was
good. Under the Chickasaw tribal law, a wife had property rights not
generally available in Mississippi, including a "right to own separate
property, to dispose of it at pleasure, to create debts and in most things
act as a feme sole."u12  The court found that the statute could not "be
construed to extend so far as to interfere with the rights to property
previously acquired."' 22 Shortly after, as Judith Younger puts it, the
Mississippi legislature "extended Fisher v. Allen to include all Missis-
sippi wives by enacting a Married Woman's Property Act.' 23
The case is a part of a story of groups and government, outsiders
and insiders, society and state. We see Indians, slaves, mothers, daugh-
ters,12 4 legislatures, and courts. Yet the configurations are not quite
what we expect. We have slave-holding Indians who are married
women. Among possible readings is an open-textured history in which a
legislature voids tribal law, while simultaneously recognizing its mar-
riages. A court limits the act of the legislature to sustain tribal law on
property theories. A legislature generalizes the ruling of the court (inci-
dentally supporting tribal law) so as to benefit all married women and
perhaps to clarify the situation for creditors.' 25 Indian law (primitive?
outsider?) sustains rights not recognized by official law (civilized? in-
sider?) that recognizes Indian laws, nonetheless, and builds on them. It
is not a clear story either of the triumph of group interest or of state
hierarchy. It is a story of interactions and interpretations.
CONCLUSION
What shape does the history of essential federalism have?
Whatever shape that history has or is given, it can not, I assume, be
121. Fisher, 3 Miss. (2 Howard) at 615.
122. Id. at 616.
123. Younger, supra note 120, at 61.
124. For an argument that some Indian tribes provide social and econ6mic autonomy to
women, see E. LEACOCK. MYTHS OF MALE DOMINANCE 236 (1981), mentioning Choctaw Indians
specifically.
125. Friedman makes the point that the litigation involving married womcn's property typi-
cally involved issues of creditors rights. L. FRIEDMAN. A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 211 (2d ed.
1985).
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the same as the shape of the history of The State or of The Law, and
the story does not begin with the Constitution, or the public/private
distinction in particular courts. "We should look to the phenomena
themselves for their proper periods," Marc Bloch suggests, noting that
we would not write a diplomatic history from Newton to Einstein. 2 '
We shape the story to the subject, and if we use official state materials,
we view them, as part of a narrative in this context, differently from
the way we would view them as part of a history of the law's approach
to a particular problem.
It is conventional in work on groups and associations in America
to turn to early commentators on our institutions and, particularly, to
the observations of Alexis de Tocqueville, whose reflections on the
structure of American society went far beyond the description of gov-
ernmental institutions. "In no country in the world has the principle of
association been more successfully used or applied to a greater multi-
tude of objects than in America. 127 Tocqueville's observations on the
importance of voluntary associations in the American political system
are so substantial that, writing in 1970, Hannah Arendt could still re-
fer to de Tocqueville's chapters on this subject as "still by far the best
in the not very large literature on the subject." '
For all the strength of de Tocqueville's work, there is, however,
reason to begin a preliminary consideration of these subjects, not with
the observer/sociologist, but with the reformer/practitioner. Justice Jo-
seph Story met Robert Owen on his American trip and wrote to his
wife that Owen was "so visionary an enthusiast that he talks like an
inhabitant of Utopia."'2 9 Yet there is another sense in which Owen,
like all practicing communitarians, had to be realistic. Owen came with
a political commitment to the idea of communities that would become
a worldwide network of communities and he related this to American
political federalism. He was not, however, a conventional federalist in
that he was not committed to that vision of diversity and experiment
that has, for some time, marked discussions of the internal states as
laboratories.
Owen visited the United States some years after New England
federalists expressed their disaffection with the central government at
126. M. BLOCH, THE HISTORIAN'S CRAFT 183 (1962).
127. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 67, at 198.
128. Arendt,.Civil Disobedience, in Is LAW DEAD? 238 (E. Rostow cd. 1971).
129. Letter from Joseph Story to his wife (Feb. 9, 1825), quoted in A. BESTOR, supra note 17,
at 106; see also 1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 485-86 (W. Story ed. 1851).
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the Hartford Convention and some years before the major American
controversies over slavery and secession. Perhaps because of those spe-
cial historical concerns-like the slavery issue, which would finally
threaten the nation itself-others in America had a more sophisticated
vision, making up, at certain points, for something Owen himself
lacked. At least one of the Americans Owen spoke with on his early
visit, John C. Calhoun, was to arrive at a full-scale commitment to the
importance of the veto power of the small group and to an attack on a
monistic theory of sovereignty in a central state. Others, whom we may
represent by Owen's meeting with Indian tribal leaders, became con-
cerned with the problem of locating sovereignties within the larger
state. A comparison between Owen's ideas and the ideas of some of the
Americans he met reveals that others, more concerned with issues of
diversity-or perhaps with maintaining their own differences-were
also more systematic in attempting to solve the structural problems of
permanent internal communities.
A lawyer comes now to the issues raised by decentralization and
pluralism with strong preconceptions in favor of the importance of offi-
cial law and the central state.1 30 This idea informs our historical narra-
tive, and we may view with surprise and even amusement the image of
Robert Owen, the "gentle bore," 13' lecturing the American Congress.
Yet Owen's concerns were closer to those of the Congress than we pres-
ently appreciate, and the distance between the utopian and the legisla-
tors was not so great as presently appears.
130. In part, this is because local community values arc not always good. "An appealing.
albeit somewhat utopian, vision of participatory democracy inrorms [states rights arguments]. Yet
the underlying reality of a long and largely successrul history or exclusion, discrimination, and
economic domination in local government remains a bit sobering." Soircr. Truisms That Never
Will Be True: The Tenth Amendment and the Spending Power, 57 U. COLO_ L REv, 793. 797
(1986).
131. G. COLE, supra note 53, at 241 (quoting the characterization or Owen in H MARTINEAU.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES 313 (London 1869)).
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